Thus, the "third cycle" of the classical experience of madness is also its essential structure because it is the discursive maddening of an image that would otherwise seem rooted in the psycho-somaticism of passions and excited bodily impulses. What Foucault calls "le langage délirant," 19 and which we might gloss as the excessiveness of discourse, is the voice of unreason that is always faintly audible behind every linguistic expression.
The voice of unreason, recorded in the explanatory structures of the classical period, is the "discours qui libérait la passion de toutes ses limites" 20 ; it is this same discursively unreasoned excess that leads the image to "entraîn[er] tout le monde des croyances et des désirs" 21 (Hf 256). The classical figuration of madness as the passional excess to the cycle of remote and proximate causes, and this classical figuration of madness as the imagistic excess to the passions, are simply the formal excesses of discourse in general, expressed firstly as intense psycho-somatic energies, secondly, as a delirious idea, and thirdly, and essentially, in the discourse of judgments of truth and error.
From this distinctly linguistic/discursive vantage, we can see the double sense of Foucault"s phrase, "la transcendance du délire." It refers to the historical, epochal conditions by which the classical period gives way to modernity; it also refers to the way that madness transcends or exceeds itself as a discursive phenomenon. When read together, these two senses of the "transcendence" of delirium prepare Foucault to take the next step in historically reconstructing the modern experience of madness. The end of the classical period is marked by the appearance of the mentally ill patient who expresses his/her madness; the medical institution responds in kind by first making that subject into a discursively identifiable, categorizable patient who is then to be treated through psychology as a science of documentation, record-keeping and prescriptive treatment. PhaenEx
This last point presents an opportunity to interrupt our close attention to the letter of Foucault"s text and step back to ask a more general question about his discursive assessment of madness in Histoire. Such an interruption also allows us to introduce the key concept of anxiety, which will figure prominently in the following sections of the essay. The question that arises at this point is: what compels Foucault to combine these last two senses of "la transcendance du délire," namely, the "transcendence" of the classical (historical) period by modernity and the "essentially" transcendent discursive character of madness? Why identify the discursive excessiveness of madness with the historical structure of (classical-modern) epochal succession?
Is there no other way to conceive of the "transcendence" of (discursive) madness than as an historical or temporal phenomenon? The stylized writings of Voltaire, noted above, seem to suggest the possibility of what might be called an "intra-discursive" form of excessive language;
it is such "intra-discursive" excess that lends Voltaire"s encyclopedic entry its ironic tone.
Voltaire can be read as capitalizing, to comedic effect, on the excessiveness of discourse, and as giving expression to that excess within the space of his own literary productions; that his writings also figure the transition from the classical period into modernity is a separate (or, at least, separable) matter.
In beginning as I have, namely, by articulating Foucault"s discursive treatment of madness in Histoire, I leave questions of the correctness of such an assessment aside. Foucault may be right or he may be wrong to conceive of madness in both the classical and modern periods along discursive lines. Further, we might challenge Foucault on his idea that discourse is excessively significant because of its expressive character. However, such questions are not of immediate relevance to the project of the present essay. What is of interest is the possibility of considering the discursivity of madness on its own terms apart from Foucault"s historicization of this phenomenon.
As will be discussed in section three, early in his philosophical career Foucault was in possession of such an "intra-discursive" conception of the excesses of madness: it is the concept of anxiety as borrowed by Foucault from Freudian psychoanalysis. Why, then, does Foucault abandon his early insight into the anxious excesses of discursive madness? As I will argue in section three, Foucault silences the anxious voice of unreason in order to proceed as he does in Histoire, namely, by way of the history of the classical and modern discourse on madness.
It serves this general argument to begin as we have with a detailed study of the discursive analysis of madness in Histoire. By such means, by working backwards in Foucault"s corpus from Histoire to his early writings on psychology and mental illness, the strategic character of Foucault"s critico-historical approach comes into focus. In an effort to retrieve a psychoanalytic conception of anxious discourse from out of Foucault"s historicization of discursive madness, and thus to cast the text of Histoire in light of the early writings on psychology and mental illness, let us pick up again the textual thread of Histoire.
As noted above, the first discursive form in which madness deliriously exceeds itself is in Foucault"s focus in this last passage is on the "overflow" or "explosion" of madness in discursively significant speech and signs. It is on such an "éclater" that modern psychology capitalizes in making the modern subject into the mentally ill patient and in constituting itself as a positivist science. The moral/normative force of the classical judgment of madness as error is simply a conversion of the "eruptive" force of all discourse; that same discursive "overflow" is inflected in the modern period away from (explicit) moral normativity and into rational, scientific positivism.
28
Using Foucault"s formulation, slightly revised, we can put the same point as follows:
there is a "delirium of language," which is a matter of its expressiveness; such excess is the "nothing" that characterizes all discourse. Or, even more succinctly, since Foucault calls madness "nothing" because of its excessiveness: language in its expressiveness is essentially mad. As such, discourse as "la paradoxale vérité de la folie" leads first the passions, then the delirious idea, and finally, the whole mind-body aggregate to exceed itself. Modern psychology then employs such discursive excess to its own end: it separates the mind from the body and in so doing constitutes for itself a patient as an object of positivistic, scientific study.
Madness cannot say itself because it is the "nothing" that language is, most that madness is a "langage silencieux" of psycho-somatic processes is to signal that it can only come to full expression through other, borrowed channels. Madness as a discursive phenomenon is expressed through bodily affects, as fantastic images or, in the case of Foucault"s study of madness, through the critical investigation of the self-constituting positivism of modern psychology.
At this point, we can return to and clarify a potential confusion. Above, Foucault"s approach in Histoire was described as "disengaging" the structures of the classical experience of madness from the encumbrances of nineteenth century scientific positivism. Foucault realizes this aim by bracketing the material body/spiritual mind distinction made in modern psychology.
In proposing to return to the classical experience of madness and "disengage" the structures that "rightly belong to it" Foucault might be taken to be operating according to a hermeneutical principle of historical/original propriety: the historian"s task is to be "true" to his or her source (material and time frame).
But, let us be clear on what is involved in such a hermeneutics. Discursivity in its expressive excess is the structure of madness; discourse thus "speaks" the truth of the nothingness of madness. Foucault"s hermeneutical task is to articulate this (discursive) truth without actually doing so: the unreason to which Foucault would give voice is silent and must remain so. If there is a hermeneutics of madness at work in Histoire, it is oriented toward the unsayable, inarticulate nothing of discourse itself. For now, I simply note this hermeneutics; in section two, I will consider at greater length its significance for Foucault"s history of madness.
Ultimately, Foucault"s goal in Histoire in retrieving the classical experience of madness from behind the shadows of its nineteenth century, scientized form, is to illuminate the latter by means of the former. Foucault aims to show that the (seemingly) merely descriptive force of scientific positivism is rooted in the prescriptive force of moral value-judgments that are carried over from the classical period. 30 The aim of the present essay, however, is not to explore these broader themes as they are developed through Histoire. discursive practice because it responds in kind to this dialogical breakdown; the analyst engages the mentally ill patient at the point where language is fractured into an "ensemble of words, signs
[and] rituals." As an institutionalized form of discourse, psychoanalysis enters into an equal exchange with the patient by admitting the significance of dreams, parapraxes, and the symbolic equivalences within freely associated words and signs. When the patient"s symptom is seen as an "intentional flight" from a present situation, whether accurately perceived or not, then the past that reemerges within the present is imaginatively de-structured, and marked by terms, images and ideas that the patient treats as all equally significant. Yet, it is only when the defense mechanism is conceived of as an intentional strategy that the individual history of the patient appears in this light and so can coincide with the evolutionary structure of discourse adhered to within the analytic setting.
As defensive mechanisms, intentionally adopted, the regressive strategies used by the patient are primarily appeals to "signification défensive"; only secondarily or derivatively are such strategies regressions to or reiterations of pathological forms, e. Freudian psychoanalysis holds out the promise of a "langage commun" in which madness and psychology might address one another across the long historical divide of nineteenth century positivism that separates them. In order to arrive at this conclusion and thereby re-envision the possible exchange between the voice of unreason contained in the speech of the madman and the institutionalized discourse of psychology, Foucault needed to overcome the influence of his early teacher and mentor; Canguilhemian/Marxist analysis of socio-cultural institutions blocked one half of this possible exchange. As such, in revising Maladie mentale for its second printing, Foucault adopted a fully discursive approach to institutions.
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The whole field of Foucault"s study must be discursively leveled, so to speak, so that human experience as a discursive phenomenon can be impacted by, and in turn impact, the discursively determined social institution of psychology. Throughout the revised edition of 54 The manner in which Foucault approaches "madness" in both texts, namely, as an "unsaid" truth behind or within the discourse of madness that runs through the modern period-and, in particular, through the positivistic language of psychology as a modern science-comes precariously close to a "hermeneutics of depth." Such a hermeneutics, Dreyfus and Rabinow continue, remains within the "part of the humanistic tradition that [Foucault] was seeking to overcome" (BSH 12).
Foucault is thus guilty of adhering to a philosophical approach that has roots in the humanist tradition that he is seeking to move beyond. What Dreyfus overlooks in confirming the failure of Maladie mentale in this way is the relation between a critical theory of discursive practices and such practices as objects of critique:
the relation, that is, between a theory and its object. In the process of interpreting historically the ways scientific-positivist discourse falters in realizing its own project of rational explanation, a "deep" discursive object forms on which a hermeneutics can be exercised. Were this not the case, Foucault could not arrive by the discursive path he follows through the classical experience of madness at the formation of the modern, mentally ill subject. While it is socio-historical practices that promulgate, shape, and direct the experience of madness, and lead to the formation of the mentally ill modern subject, Foucault is able to trace this trajectory and identify this form of modern subjectivity only because his study critically participates in the same discursive process (and leaves open a "deep hermeneutical" place for the formation of the object of its study).
The reflections in the first part of the present essay on the excessive character of discourse help explain this characteristic of Foucault"s thought. Once socio-cultural, institutional practices are treated discursively, as Foucault begins to do in the revised second part of Maladie mentale and throughout Histoire, the (discursive) excessiveness of those practices begin to accumulate within the theory that has assumed the task of critically investigating those practices.
This occurs because the directedness of the "overflow" of discourse, within its original discursive situation, is disrupted. Again, to draw on my earlier discussion of the excess of discourse (see section one, above), insofar as it is theorized by Foucault, and theorized in discursive terms, the (discursive) excessiveness of the psycho-somatic image-i.e., the "second cycle" of the classical experience of madness-is no longer equal to the "idée délirante" at the heart of that same classical experience. Some amount of that discursive excess is thus borrowed by Foucault"s own discursive, critical theory.
A consequence of the discursive theorization of socio-institutional discursive forms and practices is that the excessiveness of such discourse is in part disengaged from that form or those practices and instead accumulates within the critical theory that has effected this "disengagement" of the discursive structures. The force of the critique Foucault conducts on his various different objects of historical study is borrowed from those objects themselves. More precisely, the force of Foucault"s critique is derived from the historicization of the objects it studies: the expressive excess gleaned by Foucauldian discursive analysis is leveraged as critique through the historicization of the source discourse.
These last points are in accord with Derrida"s reflections on Foucauldian historicity in "Cogito et histoire de la folie." 55 Derrida here reads together the beginning of Descartes" first Meditation with Foucault"s interpretation of Descartes near the beginning of Histoire. The aim is to show that Foucault sequesters the hyperbolic character of Cartesian doubt in order to situate Descartes" theoretical "confinement" of madness within a historical framework. Derrida"s claim is that Foucault reproduces the early modern confinement of madness through his own criticohistorical reading of a text that he is otherwise using to exemplify such confinement.
Details of the essay aside, and of Foucault"s response in "Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu" (1972), 56 Derrida"s interest is in the way Foucault"s gesture of confinement (of Cartesian hyperbole) is a means of constituting the critical force of his own historical methodology.
Generalizing from the specifics of his reading of Foucault, Derrida can be read as problematizing the way in which philosophy constitutes itself as a critical discourse and does so by constructing itself as an historically determined object of study: "By separating, within the cogito, on the one hand, hyperbole (which I maintain cannot be enclosed in a factual and determined historical structure, for it is the project of exceeding every finite and determined totality) and, on the other and then more fully in Histoire. 57 It is in the context of this interplay between the object of a hermeneutics of depth and a critico-historical philosophy that we are able to grasp, finally, the failure of Maladie mentale. Such failure is not a matter of the text containing an incompatible, dualist methodology between a "hermeneutics of depth" and a social theory of discursive practices. A critical theory of discourse depends precisely upon such a hermeneutics for its prescriptivity. The failure of
Maladie mentale is instead that it prevents the form of discourse proper to the "deep" object of its own approach from impacting and shaping its own critical discourse.
While Foucault allows the voice of unreason as expressed in madness to influence and shape the discourse of psychology-and in so doing disrupt the latter"s pretensions to positivoscientificism-he bars the discursive form that characterizes that exchange from impacting his own study of mental illness and psychology. Foucault, in short, keeps what is in a hermeneutical sense, "proper to" the exchange between madman and therapist from influencing his own critical study of that exchange. The discursive form in question, the one that defines the discursive exchange between madness and psychology, and the one that Foucault debars from his own critical discourse on madness and psychology, is the anxious voice of unreason. Faced with a contradictory, or "ambivalent" experience of the present, the pathologically anxious patient, according to Foucault, "provoque le jeu de la protection névrotique" 64 (Mm 50).
III. Foucault, Freud, and the Discourse of Anxiety
The defensive mechanism on which la malade anxiously draws to protect against his/her present circumstances is a constituent part of his/her individual history. The patient, in short, anxiously recalls the past in defense against the present. However, the situation is not so simple. By The constant "cercle" around which the mentally ill patient moves is the one that stretches between a psychological strategy devised in the past that can be used as a present mechanism of defense and a present threat that recalls, to anxious effect, a past traumatic situation. Yet, there is no clear temporal marker within the contradictory experience of the patient that would allow us to decide between these two possibilities: the past may be the cause of, or a defensive response to, a present anxiety; or, a present anxiety may itself be projected back into the past so as to seem like a possible means of regressive defense against the present.
Again, belying the complexity of his topic, Foucault ends his reflections with the empty conclusion, "cette monotonie circulaire est le trait de l'histoire pathologique" 67 (Mm 50).
In content, Foucault"s brief remarks on angoisse at this point in Maladie mentale recall In the context of Histoire this "nothing" that is the discursive truth of madness was left unnamed. Now, with the basic discursive concept of anxiety from Maladie mentale in hand, we can think of the nothingness of madness, i.e., the voice of unreason, as the expressiveness of anxiety-the Freudian term for this same expressive nothingness is Angstsignal.
There is in Freud a "nothingness" to anxious signification comparable to that in Foucault:
there is no object of anxiety; no signified that corresponds with the signifying of anxiety. finally to admit to the insurmountable complexity of the nature and origin of anxiety. 71 There is tentativeness to the essay; Freud draws together particular strands of evidence only subsequently to allow them to unravel again under the weight of further counter-evidence. 72 The claim here is that Foucault cannot follow Freud in drawing this last, anxious conclusion. The minimum condition of a critico-historical philosophical approach, like the one In response to Derrida, we can answer that it is the critico-historical character of Foucault"s project that is gained by the disownment of its own link to psychoanalysis; that link is figured here in prominence in both theories of anxiety as a basic form of signification.
By confining a basically anxious form of discourse to his first major work on madness and psychology, Foucault derives the means of proceeding critically and historically with the history of madness. The results of this confinement are as evident as they are impressive. In repudiating his first foray into a discursive study of madness, Foucault provides himself the conditions for his own critico-historical approach, which he practices to such great effect in
Histoire. Section one above shows some of the great theoretical resources Foucault gains in abandoning a model of discourse as basically or essentially anxious, but it also hints at a kind of Voltairean or stylistic loss that Foucault suffers in subjecting his own work to retrospective critical dismissal. What Foucault forsakes by this means is a basically Freudian approach to the irregular processes through which psycho-social phenomena develop both in individuals and in cultures, and he deafens himself to the stylized, ironic manner in which those irregularities are expressed in discourse. In Derridean terms, what Foucault"s critico-historical approach conceals (or confines) is the essentially "hyperbolic" or "excessive" character of every philosophical claim, his own included.
Perhaps, though, this "Freudian" Foucault is still figured in the topic that has concerned us throughout, namely the idea of a theoretical approach as failed and susceptible to alternate approaches. Accordingly, one could read the "failure" of Maladie mentale back into Foucault"s oeuvre at a stylistic level (and thus in keeping with the Voltairean irony noted at the beginning of the present essay). In this way, each successive Foucauldian methodology-hermeneutics, archaeology, genealogy, and a sexual ethics of (care of) the self-and Foucault"s unease with the very notion of a philosophical methodology, 74 is essentially "ironized" or rendered discursively anxious. The restlessness with which Foucault moves between these different theoretical approaches would then be an anxious repetition of the first, inaugural failure that he stages retrospectively in the pages of Maladie mentale. 34 "My aim, on the contrary, is to show that mental pathology requires methods of analysis different from those of organic pathology and that it is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be attributed "illnesses of the body" and "illnesses of the mind"" (MI 10; emphasis added). 36 "A whole social evolution was required before dialogue became a mode of interhuman relation [...] The patient who is incapable of dialogue regresses through this whole social evolution" (MI 23).
Notes
37 "Dialogue, as the supreme form of the evolution of language, is replaced by a sort of monologue in which the subject tells himself what he is doing or in which he holds a dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor" (MI 23).
38 "the mastery over his symbolic world; and the ensemble of words, signs, rituals, in short, all that is allusive and referential in the human world, is no longer integrated in a system of meaningful equivalences" (MI 23-24).
39 "go beyond the evolutionist horizon defined by the notion of libido and reach the historical dimension of the human psyche" (MI 31).
40 "in the case of Freud"s patient this regression has a very precise meaning" (MI 32). 41 "not the native ground to which one returns as to a lost country, but the factitious and imaginary past of substitutions" (MI 33).
